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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
EUGENE CRANDALL, 
Deceased. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
VAL GENE CRANDALL, Executor of 
the Estate of Eugene Crandall, 
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8993 
Eugene Crandall died testate, a resident of Utah 
County, on October 29, 1957. Among the assets of his 
estate was an interest in 79 acres of real property situat-
ed in Orem, Utah, together with 51 shares of water stock 
in the Alta Ditch and Canal Co. and 15 shares of water 
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stock in the Provo Reservoir Co. Eugene Crandall held 
the said 79 acres together with a brother, Merrill Cran-
dall, and Eliza Crandall, the widow of a deceased brother, 
Raphael Crandall, as tenants in common (Tr. 4). At the 
time of the death of Eugene Crandall (hereinafter refer-
red to as Decedent) 70 acres had been planted with apple, 
pear and cherry trees and the property was being oper-
ated as a fruit farm. The remaining 9 acres were sandy 
and unproductive ( T. R. 3). 
On July 16, 1958 a commission issued out of Fourth 
Judicial District Court, Probate Division, appointing 
Arnold Mechan1, Elmer W. Bird and K. A. Randall as 
appraisers of all property of the estate subject to in-
heritance tax (R. 46), and on September 1, 1958 the said 
appraisers returned their appraisal of all property in 
the estate, which was filed with the court on October 1, 
1958 (R. 50). 
The inheritance tax appraisal described the 79 acres 
of land together with its water right, and valued the 
smne at 225,000, resulting in the inclusion in decedent's 
estate for purposes of inheritance tax of one-third of 
such value, or $75,000 (R. 47). 
On October 23, 1938 the Executor of Decedent's 
estate, Valgene Crandall, filed objections to the inherit-
ance tax appraisal and asked the court to fix the value 
of the real estate (H. 28-30). At the hearing on the Exec-
utor's objections the estate called three witnesses in sup-
port of the Ji~xl'entor 's objections and the state called 
two witnesses. Salient points of the testin1ony of each 
witness are as follows: 
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V algene Crandall, the Executor of the estate was 
called. He described the property and the water rights, 
and stated that he had worked steadily on the farm for 
eleven years, and prior to that time during the summer 
(T. 3). He stated that decedent left the property to him, 
that is was being operated as a farm, and that he intended 
to continue to operate it as a farm (T. 4). He also stated 
that in his opinion the land was worth $1,500 per acre, 
including the water right (T. 6). On cross-examination 
Mr. Crandall stated he would not sell the land even if 
offered $5,000 per acre, because he wanted to farm it; 
and that the net profit from farming the property during 
1957 amounted to $30,000 (T. 7). He further stated that 
he knew of no recent sales of other property in the same 
area and that he had no idea what the water stock alone 
was worth (T. 8). 
Ralph Halm was next called by the estate, and after 
stating that he operated a real estate office in '0rem, 
Utah County (T. 10), he said that he had appraised the 
property at $1,500 per acre for the 70 productive acres 
and $600 per acre for the nine acres that were unproduc-
tive, producing a total value of $110,400 (T. 12). In re-
sponse to a question as to whether he considered the 
water right in his appraisal, Mr. Halm stated: 
"Yes, we did determine from the owner that it 
was adequate, which we were concerned with in 
arriving at the value" (T. 11). 
On cross examination, Thir. Hahn stated that in his 
opinion the property if sold would bring no more than 
the above amount with the water stock inr1uded (T. 13); 
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that the "Provo River" water stock by itself was worth 
about $240 per share, and that the Alta Ditch stock 
varied from "seven fifty to a thousand dollars a share" 
(T~ 13-14), but that he had not attempted to value the 
water right separately "because what we were concerned 
with, was there adequate water with the ground. And if 
you took it off the ground, as far as the fruit farm is 
concerned, it would be valueless .... " (T. 14). He further 
stated that he was aware of other sales of land in the 
same area, and that $1,500 per acre is an average value · 
"for fruit ground." (T. 14) 
Milton Johnson was then called as a witness for the 
estate. He testified generally the same as did Mr. Ralph 
;Halm, except that he stated that his appraisal was based 
on , the 1and having water rights, which he identified as 
"fifty -one shares of Alta Ditch and Canal Co. and eleven 
shares of :Murdock Canal, Murdock irrigation water" (T. 
1~). He further stated, "If my office was to solicit listing 
for sa~es purposes, 'Ye would not list that less than fifteen 
hund~ed dollars per acre" (T. 18). Tie also appraised 
the p~rt which V{as unproductive bec.ause of the difficulty 
of irrigating it at $600 per acre (T. 18). 
Thereupon the estate rested, and the State called 
Arnold Mecha1n, one of the inheritance tax appraisers. 
Mr. Mecham testified that he had been in the abstracting 
business in Utah County about 37 years (T. 21). He 
stated' that in his opinion the real property in question, 
including the water rights was reasonably w'"orth $225,000, 
and that the one-third interest of the decedent was worth 
$75,000.00 (T. 23). He further stated that in his opinion 
the property was a good location for a subdivision (T. 21). 
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On cross-examination Mr. Mecham was examined: as 
to his qualifications and knowledge of the property (T~ 
24-25). He also stated that he believed he knew people 
who would give $3,000 per acre for the property, but that 
he would have to obtain their consent before naming 
them (T. 25). 
K. A. Randall, another inheritance tax appraiser, was 
next called as a witness for the State. He testified that 
he was the vice-president and cashier of the State Bank 
of Provo, and that he had acquired a familiarity with 
property values through twelve year's experience .in the 
loan business in Utah County (T. 26). He testified that 
in appraising the property for inheritance tax purposes 
he and the other appraisers had discussed the values with 
representatives of the estate, and whereas the property 
·was being used for farming purposes, its value could not 
be tied to the value of that use, since "it has a higher 
economic use and would be sold, if it were to be sold on 
the market, at a higher level"; and that in his opinion 
"the property on the average would be worth $3,000 per 
acre" (T. 27). 
On cross-exmnination l\1r. Randall testified that he 
had appraised other property in the same area. Specific-
ally, he stated he had appraised the property of a Mr. 
Stratton, whose property adjoins the property in ques-
tion here on the west, at a value which would ave!'age 
$3,000_ per acre (T. 28). Also, he had appraised the:pro-
perty of a Mr. Vern Stratton, whose property is "immedi-
ately south, across eighth north, and along the brow. Qf 
the hill. We have worked with Mr. Clive Pullen who h~ 
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along eighth north road. We worked with both Howard 
Ferguson and with Jim Ferguson, whose property 
bounds on the east" (T. 29). He also stated that he felt 
it would be possible to sell the property for $3,000 per 
acre, and that the highest use of the property would be 
for residential purposes (T. 30). 
On November 18, 1958 the Probate Court entered its 
order adopting the appraisal of Ralph Hahn and JYiilton 
Johnson, and determining the value of the "Crandall 
fruit farm asset" for inheritance tax purposes at $36,800. 
(R. 40-42). 
This appeal from the last named order of the court 
was then taken. 
STATEl\fENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE PROBATE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT 
THE TRUE APPRAISEMENT VALUE OF THE CRANDALL 
FRUIT FARM ASSET IS $36,800.00. 
ARGU~iENT 
POINT I. 
THE PROBATE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT 
THE TRUE APPRAISEMENT VALUE OF THE CRANDALL 
FRUIT FARM ASSET IS $36,800.00. 
It is the position of the State Ta.."X- Conunission that 
the Probate rourt went against the dear ·weight of the 
evidenc<' in adopting the appraisal1nade by Ralph Halm 
and Milton ~Johnson. 
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Section 59-12-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides 
as follows: 
"The value of the gross estate of the decedent 
shall be determined by including the value at the 
time of his death ... of all property, real or per-
sonal, within the jurisdiction of this state, and 
any interest therein, whether tangible or intang-
ible, which shall pass to any person ... by testa-
mentary disposition ... " (Emphasis added.) 
By Section 59-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the 
term "value" is defined as follows : 
"In this title, unless the context or subject-
matter otherwise requires: · 
" ( 5) 'Value' and 'full cash value' mean the 
amount at which the property would be taken in 
payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor." 
This court has construed the meaning of this defini-
tion in the case of Kennecott Copper vs. Salt Lake Coun-
ty, 122 Utah 431, 250 P.2d 938, 939-40, as follows: 
"Although the phrase 'the mnount at which 
the property would be taken' refers more definite-
ly to the amount at which the creditor would be 
willing to accept the property than it does to the 
amount the debtor would insist on receiving, still 
inherent in this provision is the concept that such 
amount must also be agreeable to the owner-
debtor for the creditor could not take the property 
at an amount to which the owner-debtor would 
not agree. In other words, this is a definiti,on of 
(market value.' Althmtgh it speaks in terms of 
paying debts and not sale for Ca'Sh, vt VS the price 
wh~ch would be agreed upon at .a voluntary sale 
between an owner willing to sell and a purchaser 
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willing to buy. 18 Am. Jur. 876. It means the~ same 
thing as 'just compensatvon' in connect~qn: w,ith_;; 
':eminent. domain.' " (Emphasis added.) 
With reference to the standard of just c01npensatiori;: 
the Court in the ease last cited referred to- the ca~e of 
Moyle vs. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 17 6 P .2d 882, 888, 
wherein the court said : 
"It is elemental in eminent domain cases that 
the owner is entitled to the value of the property 
for the highest and best use to which it could be 
put .... " 
The lin port of the Kennecott Case, supra would seem 
to be that the term "value" has the same 1neaning when 
it appears in the taxation statutes as it has when it ap-
pears 1n the eminent d01nain statutes, and that the "val-
ue" of property which should be included in the estate of 
a decedent means the value of the highest and best use of 
which· the property is presently capable. 
It is sub1nitted that the record indicates that the 
probate court disregarded this standard of valuation 
when it deternrined the value of the property in question. 
·The Order of Appraise1nent entered by the court 
(R. 40--43) contains no finding as to the lrighest and best 
use of this property. The order found 1nerely that the 
property was_ being operated as a fruit fa.nn and "that 
the true appraisement value for inheritance tax purposes 
of the lfa interest in said land and water right which is 
an asst~t of tlw ahovp entitled estate. is the sun1 of 
$36,800,.,00 as of, the date of said· decedent's d,eath. That 
th~ app~·nisement of said fruit fann asset of said estate, 
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made by Ralph Hahn and 1\rfilton·G. Johnson, :the apprais-
al Witnesses at the hearing, which was received ·in evi-
dence and filed· here in; is hereby found: to be true and 
correct." (R. 41). 
It is apparent from the testimony at the hearing 
that :Mr. Halm and :Mr .. Johnson in appraising the pro-
perty gave consideration only to the present use of the 
property, i.e., as a fruit farm. Note for example the 
following excerpts from Mr. Halm's testimony (T. 11): 
"Q. Now are you acquainted with the .values 
of real estate, particularly farming real 
estate, in Utah County from your experi-
ence~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you make an examination of the 
Crandall fruit farm 1 
A. Yes. 
* * * * * 
Q. Did you consider, of course, the water 
right that went with the land in your 
appraisalf 
A. Yes, we did determine from the owner 
that it was adequate, which we were con-
cerned with in arriving at the value." 
Mr. Halm testified on cross-examination as follows 
(T. 14): 
"Q. Are you aware or any other sales o£ land 
in that area 1 
·A. Yes. 
Q. How much does land sell for per acre in 
that area~ 
A. Well, up in that area, that is an average 
value for - in my opinion, that is an 
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average value,. fifteen hundred for fruit 
ground ... " (Emphasis added.) 
It is uncontroverted in the record that this property 
has a very valuable water right, the estimated value of 
. which was $55,000 to $65,000 (T. 27). Yet Mr. Halm and 
Mr. Johnson took no account of this valuable asset, ex-
cept to deterrnine that the 'vater right was "adequate." 
Mr. Halm testified ( T. 14) : 
"Q. On the basis of this value, how much 
would the total water stock be worth f 
A. I haven't calculated that. We diJdn't try 
to arrive at that figure, because what we 
were concerned with, was there adequate 
w.ater with the gro·und. And iJf you took it 
off the ground, as far as a fruit farm is 
concerned, it would be valueless, yo14 
know." (Emphasis added.) 
In the same vein, l\Ir. J olmson testified (T. 18): 
"A. . .. I do quite a lot of independent ap-
praising, and when I was asked to make 
this appraisal, I pulled actual transac-
tions which were comparable or even 
exceeded comparable value of tracts of 
land with product·£ve fruit up into the 
twenty acre view lots ... " 
Whereas, the testinwny indicates that l\fr. Halm and 
1\!r. Johnson based their appraisal upon the value of the 
property as a fruit fanu, it is uncontroYerted in the rec-
ord that the highest and best use of this property is for 
residential or snbdiYision purposes. X ote. for example, 
·the testilnony of I(. A. Randall (T. 30): 
"Q. \Veil, now. you are. basing your opinion 
· , S()lely upon what you claim the market 
'1 
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value of this property to be for the high-
est use~ 
A. That is: correct. 
Q. What is the highest use' 
A. Used for residential purposes." 
This view is confirmed b;~ the statement of Mr. 
Mecham: "I believe it's a good location for a subdivision" 
(T. 21), and certainly is not controverted by the testi-
mony of :Mr. Johnson that this property is within nine 
or ten blocks of the nearest subdivision ( T. 20), or the 
statement of :Mr. Halm to the effect that, while the pro-
perty would be suitable for subdividing, other property 
would be more suitable c:e. 15). 
It might be contended, as it was by the representa-
tives of the estate at the hearing, that the executor does 
not want to sell the land or do anything other than contin-
ue its present operation as a fruit fann. This, however, 
does not n1ean that it is proper to limit the value of the 
property for inheritance tax purposes to its value as a 
fruit farm. 
In 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, P. 107, Sec. 12.3142 
(3d ed. 1951), we find this statement relative to "market 
value": 
"Market value, as has been previously stated, 
is not limited to value for the use to which the 
land is actually devoted. 
"The most characteristic illustration of the 
rule that market value is not limited to value for 
the exi~ting use and the situation in which it is 
most frequently invoked, and also most frequently 
abused, is found in those cases where evidence is 
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· offered of what the value~ of a tract of land that 
is used for·agricultural purposes or is vacant and 
unused would be if cut up into house-lots." 
This quotation fr01n Nichols was discussed in a law 
review article contained in a: symposium on eminent do-
Inain prohlen1s published in 43 Iowa Law Review 191, 
200, Some Ele1nents of DanLage in Condemn-ation, Gard-
ner Cromwell (1958), as follows: 
"In seeking to draw the line between prospec-
tive and speculative use (and to avoid the abuse 
mentioned), courts generally accept proof of 
availability for subdivision as it might affect the 
market value of the land being considered, but 
refuse, as speculative, remote, or conjectural, de-
tailed computations of the number of lots which 
could be carved out, and the selling price of each. 
This practice is a fair compromise between con-
fining the owner to valuation at the present use 
and allowing recovery in specie for the rosiest 
dreams of real-estate prmnoters." 
This state1nent is significant. because it summarizes 
the precise 1nethod recognized by the Utah Court for 
settling the clain1s of the parties in a fair 1nanner. In 
State vs. Tedesco, 4 U. 2d 248, 250-51, 291 P. 2d 1028, 1029 
this court said : 
"A reading of the testi1nony of defendants' 
experts can lead to no other reasonable conclusion 
than that thPY arrived at their detennination of 
Parcell's val~1e [Parcell \nls then unsubdivided] 
by taking the sales prices of cmnparable lots in the 
vicinity, assigning such Yalues to the individual 
lots involved in this litigat.ion and adding then1 up, 
without eonsidering m1~, cost or expense incident 
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. ~ l·i,tq the sale of eayh:.Pf th~ l9,ts or ;th:e ti~e within 
.w:hich the lots might b,ave. been sold. 
-* *·* * * 
"A condemnee is not entitled to realize a prof-
it on his property. It must go to the condemnor 
for its fair market value, as is, irrespective of any 
claimed value based on an aggregate of val1;1es 
o£ individual lots in a subdivision which one hopes 
to sell at a future time to individuals rather than 
to an individual. The test is not what· the lots will 
bring when and if 62 willing buyers come along, 
but what the tract, as a unit, and as is, platted or 
not, and in whatever state of completion, will 
bring from a willing buyer of the whole tract." 
In this respect it should be pointed out that the in-
heritance tax appraisers made no detailed computations 
of what individual lots in a subdivision would bring if 
sold separately, but rather based their opinion upon what 
the entire tract would sell for on an acreage basis for 
subdivision purposes. The main difference of opinion at 
the hearing seemed to be whether such a computation 
was proper in view of the facts that the decedent had 
used it as a fruit farm, and that the executor stated that 
he wished to continue so to use the property. Note the 
following extract from the cross-examination of Mr. Ran\ 
dall (T. 29-30): 
"Q. Well now, you are basing your opinion 
solely upon what you claim the market 
value of this property to be for the high-
est use~ 
A. That is correct. 
Q. What is the highest use~ 
A. Used for residential purposes. 
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Q. You have heard two appraisers from 
Orem this morning who say that it is fif-
teen hundred dollars - is the value of 
that property on the market' 
A. I also heard Mr. Halm say he appraised 
it as a fruit farm, and I heard Mr. John-
son say he agreed to the same answer of 
Mr. Halm. 
Q. You said something about market value 
meaning a buyer who is willing to buy 
and a seller who is willing to sell 1 
A. That is right. 
Q. All right. You heard Mr. Crandall say 
he wanted to farm this ground 1 
A. That is right. 
Q. That it was being farmed at the time his 
father died 1 
A. That is correct. 
Q. So you have an unwilling [seller], 
haven't you 1 
A. I don't believe that has any basis on the 
valuation. 
Q. You don't 1 
A. In what our assignment is from the state 
of Utah. If he wants- I an1 not saying 
that ~Ir. Crandall has to sell the property. 
All I an1 saying is we have a responsibil-
ity in our esti1nation to appraise the pro-
perty." 
It is subn1itted that the appraisers en1ployed by the 
estate deterrnined the value of the property only from 
the standpoint of its present use, and gave no consider-
ation to any other possible use of the property, and that 
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in adopting their appraisal the Probate court went 
against the clear weight of the evidence. 
One other fact disclosed in the record helps substan-
tiate this view. The executor stated on cross-examination 
that the property produced $30,000 in net income during 
the last year prior to the death of the decedent. In the 
case of In Re Clift's Estate, 70 Utah 409, 260 Pac. 859 
this court gave recognition to the practice of appraising 
incmne producing property by capitalizing the net income 
to arrive at the fair market value thereof. In the court's 
explanation of the testimony of Edward J\L Ashton, who 
had used the net income method, most of the discussion 
concerned the computation by which Mr. Ashton arrived 
at the net income figure. In the present case the executor 
himself supplied the net income figure. 
In the Clift case Mr. Ashton capitalized the net in-
come at 6o/o, which the court explained, was about the 
average rate of interest on loans secured by real estate 
mortgages. In many other cases courts have recognized 
the efficacy, during normal years, of using 6% as the 
basis for capitalization of net income for determining 
market value. Among them are : 
LmtisviUe & Nashvvlle R. Co. v. Greene) 244 U.S. 
522, 37 S. Ct. 683, 61 L.ed. 1271; Ill. Cent. R. Co. vs. 
Greene) 244 U.S. 555, 37 S.Ct. 697, 61 L.ed 1309; Lmtis-
ville & N.R. Co. vs. Coulter 131 Fed. 282, 303; Pleasant 
vs. Mo-Ka11r-Tex R~ Co.) 66 F.2d 842; Great Northern R. 
vs. Weeks) 297 U.S. 135, 56 S. Ct. 426, 80 L. ed. 532; 
Wisconsin Gas & Electrvc Co. vs. TiVisconsin Tax Com-
miss,ion, 221 Wis. 487, 266 N.W. 186. 
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Present times might not be considered as normal, so 
that the use of 6% as a capitalization factor might not be 
proper. However, in order to appraise property which 
produces $30,000 worth of net income at $110,400, one 
would have to use a capitalization factor of 27%. Cer-
tainly the court should take judicial notice of the fact 
that present day interest rates on loans secured by real 
estate mortgages do not approach 27%. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the find-
ings of the Probate Court and its adoption of the apprais-
al made by Mr. Halm and Mr. Johnson are against the 
clear preponderance of the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons Appellant respectfully 
contends that this court should reverse the findings of the 
Probate Court, and affirm the appraisal as made by the 
inheirtance tax appraisers, or at the very least, should 
remand the case for the taking of more complete evidence 
upon the question of the fair n1arket value of the property 
in question. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General of Utah 
JOHN G. MARSHALL 
BEN E. RAWLINGS 
DAVID E. WEST 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
Asst. Attorneys General, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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